📜 Avodah Zarah — 20b

and a person should not gaze upon the colored garments of a woman; and a person should not gaze at a male donkey, at a female donkey, at a pig, at a sow, or at fowl, when they are mating; and even if one were full of eyes like the Angel of Death and saw from every direction, it is not permitted to look. They said about the Angel of Death that he is entirely full of eyes. When a sick person is about to die, the Angel of Death stands above his head, with his sword drawn in his hand, and a drop of poison hanging on the edge of the sword. Once the sick person sees him, he trembles and thereby opens his mouth; and the Angel of Death throws the drop of poison into his mouth. From this drop of poison the sick person dies, from it he putrefies, from it his face becomes green. The Gemara answers: Rabban Gamliel did not intentionally look at the woman; rather, he was walking around a corner and he saw her unexpectedly as they each turned. With regard to the statement in the baraita: Nor may one gaze at the colored garments of a woman, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: This is the halakha even if they are spread on a wall, not only when they are being worn. Rav Pappa says: And the prohibition applies only when one knows their owner. Rava said: The language of the baraita is also precise, as it teaches: Nor may one gaze at the colored garments of a woman, and it does not teach: Nor may one gaze at colored garments. Learn from it that the prohibition applies only to the garments of one he knows. Rav Ḥisda said: That statement applies only in the case of old garments, i.e., garments that have been worn; but in the case of new garments, we have no problem with it. The reason is that if you do not say so, how can we give a woman’s garment before it is worn to a launderer, i.e., one who prepares new garments for use, knowing that the launderer must look at the garments? The Gemara refutes this proof: But according to your reasoning, i.e., your assumption that a launderer is no different from all other men, there is a similar difficulty with that which Rav Yehuda says: If one wishes to mate an animal of one species with an animal of its own species, it is permitted to insert the male organ into the female like a brush into a tube. One could ask here as well: But isn’t he looking at the animals as they mate? Rather, he is occupied with his work, and therefore his mind will not entertain sinful thoughts. So too with regard to a launderer, he is occupied with his work, and therefore a launderer differs from other men. § The Master said above in the baraita: From this drop of poison on the Angel of Death’s sword, the sick person dies. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this opinion disagrees with a statement of Shmuel’s father? As Shmuel’s father says: The Angel of Death said to me: Were I not concerned for human dignity, I would uncover the place of the incision of the slaughter, as one does to an animal that is slaughtered. This indicates that the Angel of Death kills by slaughtering his victims with his sword, not by poisoning them. The Gemara answers: Perhaps that drop of poison cuts the two organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter, i.e., the trachea and the esophagus, and thereby slaughters people. The Gemara notes that the continuation of the baraita, which states that from this drop of poison a corpse putrefies, supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana. As Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana says that they say in the school of Rav: One who wishes that his dead relative will not putrefy should turn it on its face immediately, as the drop of poison enters through the mouth, and this causes the putrefaction of the corpse. § The Gemara cites another source that interprets the verse cited above. The Sages taught a baraita explaining the verse: “And you shall keep yourself from every evil thing” (Deuteronomy 23:10), which is immediately followed by the verse: “If there be among you any man who is not ritually pure by reason of that which happened to him by night” (Deuteronomy 23:11). This teaches that a person should not think impure thoughts by day and thereby come to the impurity of an emission by night. From here Rabbi Pineḥas ben Ya’ir would say: Torah study leads to care in the performance of mitzvot. Care in the performance of mitzvot leads to diligence in their observance. Diligence leads to cleanliness of the soul. Cleanliness of the soul leads to abstention from all evil. Abstention from evil leads to purity and the elimination of all base desires. Purity leads to piety. Piety leads to humility. Humility leads to fear of sin. Fear of sin leads to holiness. Holiness leads to the Divine Spirit. The Divine Spirit leads to the resurrection of the dead. And piety is greater than all of them, as it is stated: “Then You did speak in a vision to Your pious ones” (Psalms 89:20). And this statement disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Humility is greater than all of them, as it is stated: “The spirit of the Lord God is upon me; because the Lord has anointed me to bring good tidings to the humble” (Isaiah 61:1). Since the pious is not stated, but rather “the humble,” you learn that humility is greater than all of them. § The mishna teaches that one may not sell to a gentile any item that is attached to the ground. The Sages taught: One may sell to them a tree on the condition that he cut it down, and the buyer cuts it down; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One may sell to them only a tree that has actually been cut down. Similarly, one may sell to them fodder, i.e., produce that has grown stalks but is not yet ripe, on the condition to cut it down, and he cuts it down; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One may sell to them only fodder that has been cut down. So too, one may sell to them standing grain on the condition to harvest it, and he harvests it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One may sell to them only harvested grain. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state the halakha in each of these different scenarios. As, had the baraita taught us the dispute only with regard to a tree, I might have said that it is only in that case that Rabbi Meir says it must be cut down before being sold. The reason is that since the gentile does not lose out by keeping the tree in the soil, he might keep it in the ground. But in this case of standing grain, since if he keeps it in the ground he will lose out, one might say that Rabbi Meir concedes to Rabbi Yehuda that it may be sold before being harvested, on the condition that the gentile will harvest it, because the gentile would not leave the grain in the soil to spoil. And had the baraita taught us only these two halakhot, one might have said that Rabbi Yehuda permits selling these items on the condition that they be cut down because the improvement to the tree or grain is not recognizable when it is left in the ground. But in the case of fodder, whose improvement is recognizable, as it would continue to grow and ripen if left in the ground, one might say that Rabbi Yehuda concedes to Rabbi Meir that we are concerned that the gentile will not cut down the fodder, and therefore one may sell it only once it has been cut down. And furthermore, had the baraita taught us only the dispute in this case of fodder, one might have said that it is merely in this case that Rabbi Meir says it must be cut down before being sold, but with regard to those cases of a tree or standing grain, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Yehuda that one may sell these items before they are harvested on the condition that the gentile will harvest them, as there is no recognizable improvement to them if they are left in the ground. Consequently, it is necessary for the dispute to be stated in all three cases. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to the sale of large livestock, which is forbidden due to the concern that the gentile might use them to perform labor (see 14b), if such livestock are sold on the condition that the gentile will slaughter them, what is the halakha? The Gemara explains the aspects of the dilemma: There, in the mishna, what is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda permits the sale of a tree on the condition that the gentile will cut it down? Is the reason that the trees are not in the gentile’s domain and therefore he is not able to keep them, as the Jew will force him to cut them down? But in the case of large livestock, since the animal stands in the domain of the gentile once it is sold, there is a concern that he might keep it and not slaughter it. Or perhaps there is no difference between the cases, and Rabbi Yehuda would permit one to sell even large livestock to a gentile, on the condition that he will slaughter the animals. The Gemara suggests a resolution: Come and hear, as it is taught in a baraita: One may sell large livestock to a gentile on the condition that he slaughter it, and he slaughters it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One may sell to a gentile only a slaughtered animal. One may not rent a house to a gentile in Eretz Yisrael, and needless to say one may not rent fields to them, as explained in the Gemara. And in Syria